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ESSAY
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND TEXAS' TEN PERCENT
SOLUTION: IMPROVING DIVERSITY
AND QUALITY
David Orentlicher*
I. INTRODUCTION
As the federal courts become increasingly hostile to traditional
affirmative action programs in higher education, it appears that racial
diversity at colleges and universities will suffer greatly. Indeed, in the
wake of Hopwood v. Texas' in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, minority enrollment at the University of Texas School of Law
has declined dramatically. Progress toward a more integrated society
may not only be slowed but even reversed.
This conservative shift in public policy may have a surprisingly
radical effect, however. As universities in Texas and other states
search for legally acceptable alternatives to the rejected affirmative ac-
tion programs, they may end up with approaches that are less effective
at promoting racial diversity in the short run but that may prove
equally effective in the long run. By generating unexpected benefits
for another critical problem in the United States-the poor quality of
many primary and secondary public schools-the alternative ap-
proaches may do as much as traditional affirmative action programs to
* Professor and Co-Director, Center for Law and Health, Indiana University
School of Law - Indianapolis. B.A. Brandeis University 1977; M.D., Harvard Medical
School 1981;J.D. Harvard Law School 1986.
This article was written with the support of the Visiting DeCamp Professorship at
Princeton University. I am grateful for the thoughtful comments of Anthony Broh,
Frank Dobbin, Judy Failer, Amy Gutmann, Michael Heise, Jennifer Hochschild,
Stanley Katz, and Beverly Ledbetter, and the editorial assistance of William Hahn,
Ethan York, and the Notre Dame Law Review.
1 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996) (rejecting the affirmative action program at the
University of Texas School of Law).
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overcome some of the causes for lower academic achievement by
minorities.
In this article, I will focus on one alternative approach that holds
considerable promise. In 1997, the Texas legislature ordered each of
the state's public undergraduate institutions to admit all applicants
whose grade point averages were in the top ten percent of their high
school's graduating class.2 This strategy has been touted for its ability
to encourage minority enrollment from high schools that have an
overwhelmingly minority student body. What has gone unnoticed is
the fact that the approach may do much to improve the public pri-
mary and secondary schools by altering incentives for school quality.
Current incentives encourage politically influential parents of school-
age children to prefer a two-tiered educational system in which their
children attend the stronger schools and the children of politically
weak parents attend the poorer schools. Under the Texas approach,
parents have less to gain from concentrating their children at stronger
schools and more to gain from dispersing their children over a larger
number of schools. Accordingly, Texas' ten percent policy may lead
to a public school system with smaller disparities in quality from
school to school.
II. THE HOPWOOD DECISION
As a result of the Fifth Circuit's Hopwood decision, public and pri-
vate universities in Texas,3 and private universities in Louisiana and
2 According to 1997 Texas General Laws 155,
Each general academic teaching institution shall admit an applicant for ad-
mission to the institution as an undergraduate student if the applicant grad-
uated in one of the two school years preceding the academic year for which
the applicant is applying for admission from a public or private high school
in this state . . . with a grade point average in the top 10 percent of the
student's high school graduating class.
TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803 (West 1998).
3 Because Hopwood was brought under both the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause and Titie VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, the
decision arguably applies not only to public institutions but also to private institutions
that receive federal financial assistance. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 938, 957. Accordingly,
many private universities in the Fifth Circuit have dismantled their affirmative action
programs in the wake of Hopwood. Personal communication, Shirley Redwine, Gen-
eral Counsel, Rice University (March 5, 1998).
To be sure, there is some disagreement whether Hopwood should be read as ap-
plying to private institutions, but it is being read that way. Title VI claims have been
brought successfully against public institutions other than the University of Texas.
See, e.g., Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287 (1978)
(holding that Title VI proscribes racial discrimination that would be proscribed by the
[VOL. 74:1
1998] AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND TEXAS' TEN PERCENT SOLUTION 183
Mississippi,4 are almost entirely precluded from employing racial
"preferences"5 in their admissions policies. In addition, the universi-
ties can almost never take race into consideration in other ways in the
admissions process.
Although the Hopwood decision is strictly limited to the Fifth Cir-
cuit, its reasoning may be influential outside the Fifth Circuit. The
Hopwood judges rested their logic on their interpretation of recent
Supreme Court decisions on affirmative action. If their interpretation
is consistent with the views of the Court's majority, Hopwood may be a
bellwether of future Supreme Court jurisprudence.
In Hopwood, the court discussed and rejected two types of race-
conscious admissions policies. As to the first type, a racial preference
policy, the court reviewed a two-track system for ranking applicants.
The University of Texas School of Law had placed its applicants into
the categories of "presumptive admit," "presumptive deny," or a mid-
dle "discretionary zone."'6 This initial categorization was based on a
weighted average of high school grade point average (GPA) and score
on the Law School Aptitude Test (LSAT) .7 It was a two-track system
because minority applicants fell into the "presumptive admit" or "dis-
cretionary zone" categories with lower scores than did nonminority
applicants. Indeed, the presumptive admit score for minority appli-
Fourteenth Amendment). Title VI has also been used successfully on occasion
against a private university. See Flanagan v. President and Directors of Georgetown
College, 417 F. Supp. 377 (D.D.C. 1976) (finding race-based financial aid to violate
Title VI under some circumstances).
4 Louisiana and Mississippi are still under court orders to complete the desegre-
gation of their public universities, and affirmative action policies are part of the ef-
forts to eliminate the effects of their prior systems of segregated higher education. See
United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717 (1992) (holding that Mississippi had not yet
eliminated the effects of its prior system of segregated higher education); United
States v. Louisiana, 751 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. La. 1990) (discussing Louisiana's obliga-
tions to achieve a desegregated system of higher education).
5 By racial "preferences," I mean policies in which an admissions committee ad-
mits minority applicants when they would deny admission to nonminorities with the
same credentials. For example, in Hopwood, the court was troubled by systems in
which minority applicants can be admitted with grades and achievement test scores
that would result in a denial of admission for nonminority applicants.
6 Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 935.
7 The grade point average was given 40% of the weight, and the ISAT score was
given 60% of the weight. See id. at 935 n.1. By the time of the appellate court's
decision, the law school had actually stopped using a two-track system. See Hopwood
v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 582 n.87 (W.D. Tex. 1994) (noting that, starting with the
1995 entering class, the school dropped its approach of using presumptive admission
and presumptive denial scores).
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cants was lower than the presumptive deny score for nonminority
applicants.8
The second type of admissions policy reviewed by the Hopwood
court was the Bakke type of policy in which racial diversity is viewed as
a "plus" in the admissions process. In his opinion for the court in
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,9 Justice Lewis Powell had
written that universities could take race into account in the same way
that they take into account other measures of diversity of their stu-
dents, such as home states, athletic skills, and musical talent.10 Thus,
under Bakke, it is permissible for universities to seek a racially diverse
student body, just as it is permissible for them to seek a geographi-
cally, athletically, or musically diverse student body.1'
According to the Hopwood court, racial preferences and race as a
"plus" could be used only as a means to remedy past discrimination
and only if the past discrimination had been committed by the Uni-
versity of Texas School of Law itself. Relying on the U.S. Supreme
Court's affirmative action decisions, 12 the Hopwood court held that
race-conscious admission policies could not be justified by efforts to
remedy general societal discrimination, to remedy discrimination in
the state's primary and secondary public schools, or to achieve racial
diversity in the student body.13 The court further held that the Law
School had not shown that its race-conscious admissions policies were
sufficiently related to the goal of remedying past discrimination. 14 In-
8 Minorities were presumptively admitted with a score of 189 or higher. White
applicants were presumptively rejected with a score of 192 or lower. Hopwood, 78 F.3d
at 936.
9 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
10 See id. at 315-19.
11 The Hopwood court and some legal scholars have argued that this part of Jus-
tice Powell's opinion is not a holding of the Supreme Court since he spoke only for
himself. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944. However, inasmuch as four other justices were
willing to permit racial preferences, it is fair to assume that those four justices were
also willing to permit race as a plus in the admissions process.
12 The Hopwood court cited Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267
(1986) (striking down racial preferences for layoffs of teachers who were hired under
an affirmative action program designed to remedy past discrimination), City of Rich-
mond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (striking down a set-aside program for
subcontractors on city construction projects), and Adarand Constructors, Inc., v. Pena,
515 U.S. 200 (1995) (striking down a financial incentive for contractors to hire minor-
ity subcontractors on federal highway construction projects). For a recent critique of
the Supreme Court's affirmative action jurisprudence, see Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative
Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427 (1997) (arguing that the Court has misapplied the Equal
Protection Clause's strict scrutiny level of review in the context of affirmative action).
13 See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 940-52.
14 See id. at 952-55.
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asmuch as the University of Texas School of Law once did deny admis-
sion to African-Americans, 15 its inability to use that history to defend
its affirmative action policies indicates that it will be difficult for other
universities to justify an affirmative action policy in terms of the goal
of remedying past discrimination. 16
Of particular concern is the Hopwood court's rejection of the
Bakke type of policy. If race cannot be considered at all, it will be very
hard for universities to maintain a racially diverse student body.
Schools might try to take into account an applicant's socioeconomic
deprivation, thereby replacing race-conscious preferences with class-
conscious preferences. 17 However, giving preferences to students who
are from families that are disadvantaged socially and economically will
probably still result in an overwhelmingly white student body. At all
income levels, white students outperform minority students on
achievement tests and in terms of grades.' 8 As Professor Michael Oli-
vas has observed, alternatives to considering race can help improve
racial diversity, but "[i] n the end, race is the only proxy for race."' 9
After the Hopwood decision, all of the public and many of the
private universities in Texas abandoned their affirmative action pro-
grams, and minority admissions dropped substantially at the state's
leading institutions of higher education. In the first year after Hop-
wood, the entering class at the University of Texas School of Law had
four African-Americans compared with thirty-one in the previous year.
The drop-off in Latinos was not as dramatic. Their numbers fell from
forty-two to twenty-six. 20 Among entering freshmen at undergraduate
15 See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (requiring the University of Texas
School of Law to admit black students).
16 For another decision employing a strict standard for universities to demon-
state that they are remedying past discrimination, see Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d
147 (4th Cir. 1994). Still, even in the Fifth Circuit, there is some room for affirmative
action. As mentioned earlier, Louisiana and Mississippi are under court orders to
dismantle their prior systems of segregated higher education. See supra note 4.
17 See RICHARD KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY- CLASS, RACE AND AFRMArIvE ACTION
(1996).
18 See K ANTHoNY APA & Amy GUTMANN, COLOR CONSCIOUS: THE POLTrICAL
MORALITY OF RACE 138-42 (1996); see also Deborah C. Malamud, Assessing Class-Based
Affirmative Action, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 452, 464-71 (1997) (discussing why affirmative
action for economically disadvantaged students will not be successful at achieving ra-
cial equality in higher education).
19 Peter Applebome, Seeking New ApproachesforDiversity, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 23, 1997,
at B7 (quoting Professor Olivas).
20 See William E. Forbath & Gerald Torres, The Talented Tenth' in Texas, THE NA-
TION, Dec. 15, 1997, at 20, 21. Since the first-year class at the law school has 475
students, Quick Facts and Statistics, <http://www.utexas.edu/law/admissions/facts.
html> (last modified Sept. 10, 1997), the percentage of African-American students
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colleges in Texas, there was a decline in African-American enrollment
of about thirty-eight percent at University of Texas at Austin, thirty-
seven percent at Texas A&M University, and forty-two percent at Rice
University.21 Latino freshmen admissions at the three schools
dropped by about four percent, twenty-four percent, and twenty-one
percent, respectively. The declines in minority enrollment resulted
partly because of fewer minority admissions, partly because of dimin-
ished interest by minorities in attending a heavily white school, and
partly because of less generous financial aid for minority students. 22
dropped from more than 6% to less than 1% of the class, and the percentage of
Latino students declined from nearly 9% to less than 6% of the class. According to
1994 estimates from the U.S. Bureau of the Census, African-Americans make up 12%
of the population and Latinos 27% of the population in Texas. See U.S. Bureau of the
Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1997 at 34 (117th ed. 1997).
California has had a similar experience recently. As a result of Resolution SP-1
which was passed by the Board of Regents in 1995, and Proposition 209, which was
approved by voter referendum on November 5, 1996, public universities in California
may no longer employ affirmative action in admissions (or hiring) decisions. See CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 31 (a). The impact on admissions at the law schools at UC Berkeley
and UCLA has been as profound as the impact of the Hopwood decision at the Univer-
sity of Texas School of Law. The number of African-Americans who were admitted
for the first-year classes dropped by 80% at each of the two schools, with only one
African-American student matriculating at Berkeley and ten at UCLA in their
1997-98 entering classes. Latino admissions dropped by 50% at Berkeley and 25% at
UCLA. See Danny Feingold, Test Tube for a Changing Political Climate, Los ANGELES
TIMES, October 6, 1997, at El. For a discussion of Proposition 209, see Eugene
Volokh, The California Civil Rights Initiative: An Interpretive Guide, 44 UCLA L. REv.
1335 (1997). For the Fall 1998 entering class at UC Berkeley Law School (Boalt Hall),
nine African-American students enrolled (still down from the twenty in the Fall 1996
entering class). See New Black Students at Berkeley Climb to 9, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1998,
at A20. For a discussion of affirmative action at UC Berkeley and UCLA, see Michael
W. Lynch, Affirmative Action at the University of California, 11 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHics &
PUB. POL'Y 139 (1997).
An empirical study of law school admissions nationally indicates that, if other law
schools eliminated race as a consideration in admissions decisions, their acceptance
rate for minority students would also plummet. See Linda F. Wightman, The Threat to
Diversity in Legal Education: An Empirical Analysis of the Consequences of Abandoning Race
as a Factor in Law School Admission Decisions, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1997).
21 See Lydia Lum, Freshman Fallout; Minority Enrollment: How to Stop the Hemorrhag-
ing?, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 24, 1997, at A19 (comparing enrollment in fall 1996
with final projected enrollment for fall 1997).
22 The abandonment of racial preferences in awarding scholarship aid may have
as much to do with declining minority enrollments as the abandonment of racial
preferences in admissions. See Sylvia Moreno, Senate Backs Bill to Boost Colleges' Minority
Ranks; Some Officials Skeptical, Say State Must Increase Aid to Achieve Goa DALLAS MoRN-
ING NEWS, May 9, 1997, at Al.
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The Hopwood decision has been much criticized, especially its re-
jection of the standard interpretation of Bakke, according to which
race can be taken into account as a "plus" in the admissions process.
Although I share the concerns about the Hopwood decision, it is not
my goal to address them here. Rather, my point is to show how the
response to the decision may have important, unexpected benefits for
society. In other words, although I believe Hopwood was wrongly de-
cided, there may be a silver lining in the Fifth Circuit's decision.
III. THE TEXAS TEN PERCENT APPROACH
In response to Hopwood and its impact on minority admissions,
the Texas legislature adopted its "ten percent solution" in May 1997.
As mentioned, the Texas law requires each of the public undergradu-
ate colleges in the state to admit all applicants who graduated in the
top ten percent of their high school class. The law was pushed by
African-American and Latino lawmakers, and it seems especially well-
suited for Texas. Residential segregation in the state's cities is high, so
the majority of students attend schools that are highly racially segre-
gated.23 Accordingly, accepting the top ten percent of high school
graduates is an effective way for the racial makeup of admitted stu-
dents to more closely mirror the racial makeup of high school gradu-
ates in the state.
In its first year, however, the law appears to be having limited
effect. At the University of Texas at Austin, for example, somewhat
less than fifty percent of the freshman class will probably come
through the automatic admissions of students who were in the top ten
percent of their high school class, a percentage that is consistent with
recent years.2 4 However, over time, the law is expected to have a sub-
stantial impact. Indeed, the University of Texas at Austin could easily
fill its entering freshman class with students who finished in the top
ten percent of their high school graduating class.2 5
23 See Forbath & Torres, supra note 20, at 20.
24 Before the new Texas law, 94% of applicants from the top 10% of class rank
had been admitted as undergraduates at University of Texas at Austin. The absence
of an effect of the Texas law in its first year of operation likely reflects the fact that
many students either were unaware of the law or did not realize that it applied to all
undergraduate programs in the state's system of higher education. Personal commu-
nication, Bruce Walker, Director of Undergraduate Admission, University of Texas at
Austin (March 6, 1998).
25 There were 6,645 freshman who enrolled in the fall of 1997, and there are
more than 17,000 students who will qualify for automatic admission under the ten
percent law. See Moreno, supra note 22 (noting that 16,828 of high school students in
Texas who took the SAT were in the top 10% of their class). Of course, many of the
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A. Policy Implications
Much of the debate about the Texas law has centered around its
ability to generate racial diversity in the state's public colleges and on
whether it is appropriate to give so much weight to grades and so little
weight to achievement test scores in admissions decisions. These are
important questions.2 6 Nevertheless, my focus will be on another im-
portant issue that has not received much, if any, attention. I will ex-
plore the possibility that approaches like the Texas law can have an
unintended, but critical, impact on the quality of public schools. This
will be the case particularly if the country's elite private colleges were
to adopt the Texas model.27
Briefly, the argument works as follows. The Texas policy has the
potential to generate important improvements in the quality of public
schools because it changes the incentives of parents in choosing their
children's schools. Under the current system, parents believe their
children are better off if they attend a relatively strong high school, so
middle and upper income parents prefer a two-tiered system in which
there are some stronger schools and some weaker schools. Under the
Texas approach, the benefits of attending a stronger high school are
reduced, so middle and upper income parents may prefer a system in
which quality is more evenly distributed across high schools.
1. Incentives Under the Traditional System
Traditional standards for admission to college encourage middle
and upper income parents to concentrate their resources on only
some school districts and to send their students to schools in those
districts. If students attend higher quality schools, they will receive a
top ten percent students will prefer to go to other colleges, either in Texas or out of
state. In addition, the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board has given public
colleges permission to limit the admissions of top ten percent applicants if their num-
bers become very large. See Lydia Lum, Law Schools May Rework Admissions; Efforts
Could Increase Enrollments of Minorities, HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 17, 1997, at A33.
26 For example, while some commentators believe that achievement tests, like the
SAT, are valuable in assessing college applicants, the tests have been criticized as be-
ing racially biased and as being weak indicators of academic ability. See, e.g., Michael
Selmi, Testingfor Equality: Merit, Efficiency, and the Affirmative Action Debate, 42 UCLA L.
REV. 1251 (1995); Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Re-
claiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REv. 953 (1996). It has also been argued that
consideration of SAT scores actually favors minorities since data indicate the scores
overpredict the freshman grades of African-American college students.
27 Because Hopwood was also decided as a Title VI case, see supra note 3, private
universities in the Fifth Circuit have the same need as public universities under Hop-
wood to find alternatives to traditional affirmative action programs.
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were attending one of the "weaker" schools, the parents would push
for improvements in the quality of the school. The upper and middle
socioeconomic classes might still focus their attention on the schools
that their children attend, but the number of such schools would have
increased. The gap in quality between the top public schools and the
bottom schools would narrow, and school quality would become more
uniformly high.
Moreover, the Texas policy could avoid a common problem seen
with other changes in educational policy that affect public primary
and secondary schools. The changes often fail to have the desired
effect because parents opposed to the new policies can send their stu-
dents to private schools.3 3 However, just as the advantages of a strong
public school diminish under a Texas-like approach, so do the advan-
tages of a strong private school. If students are admitted to a top col-
lege from private high schools only if they finish in the top one, five,
or ten percent of their class, the private high schools confer less of a
benefit in terms of college placement. In other words, under a Texas-
like admissions policy, it is hard for families to circumvent the poten-
tial effects of the policy on public primary and secondary schools by
exiting the public school system entirely.
The effects on school quality would have a secondary effect on
minority student representation. Currently, minority students suffer
in the college admissions process 'because they often attend weaker
schools where the education is of poorer quality. If the Texas ap-
proach improved school quality more broadly, minority students
would be less disadvantaged by having to attend weak schools. They
would receive higher quality educations, and they would be better pre-
pared for college. As a result, colleges would see stronger applications
from minority students. Accordingly, although in the short run a
Texas-like policy would probably not generate as high a minority stu-
dent representation in universities as have traditional affirmative ac-
tion policies, the Texas approach might be as successful in the long
run at raising minority student representation in higher education.
There is, then, a plausible argument that a Texas-like approach
may be more than just a silver lining. If it can address some of the
root causes of social inequality, it may be a powerfidl vehicle for ad-
dressing socioeconomic disparities in this country, perhaps one that is
as successful as traditional affirmative action programs. Moreover, to
33 The availability of an "exit" option can easily frustrate changes in policy. For
example, efforts to racially integrate the public primary and secondary schools have
been undermined by the freedom of parents to send their children to private schools
or to move to a different public school system.
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the extent that affirmative action has primarily benefited the more
privileged members of minority groups,3 4 an approach that has
broader impact would be desirable. The Texas approach is also at-
tractive because it can avoid some of the criticisms of affirmative ac-
tion. For example, minorities who are accepted to college because
they are at the top of their class need not feel stigmatized by a sense
that they have received special treatment.35 Similarly, there is no "re-
verse discrimination" at work since all persons are eligible to finish in
the top ten percent of their class.
The Texas approach has considerable potential because it estab-
lishes an important link between the fortunes of the well-to-do and
the less fortunate in society. As indicated, in the traditional system,
middle and upper income parents can protect the interests of their
own children while neglecting the needs of other children. Indeed,
children of the well-to-do may be better off in an educational system
with two tiers of quality since fewer students will receive the education
necessary to make them competitive in the college application pro-
cess. The Texas approach drives middle and upper income parents
toward a system that is closer to a single tier of quality.
The analogy to public benefit programs is instructive. Programs
like Social Security and Medicare have been fairly successful in meet-
ing the needs of the poor because they cover everyone regardless of
wealth. The more prosperous beneficiaries can protect their stake in
the programs only if they also protect the stake of the poor. Other
programs, like public housing and Medicaid, have been less successful
because they cover only the indigent and suffer from their benefi-
ciaries' lack of political power.3 6 When the well-to-do vote against in-
creased funding for public housing or Medicaid, they are not harming
their own interests. Indeed, they are serving their own economic in-
terests by preventing the redistribution of their wealth.3 7
34 Although the income gap between Afican-American men and white men nar-
rowed between 1969 and 1976, the gap has since widened. See BARBARA R. BERCMANN,
IN DEFENSE OF AFFrIRmATIE ACTION 36-38 (1996).
35 See STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY (1991)
(discussing the stigmatization effect of affirmative action).
36 For arguments discussing the advantages of "universal" rather than "targeted"
social programs, see THEDA SKOCPAL, SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES: FUTURE
POSSIBILITIES IN HIsToRICAL PERSPECTIVE 250-74 (1995); WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE
TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 118-24
(1987).
37 To be sure, there is an argument that everyone is better off if there is not an
indigent class. Nevertheless, that argument requires a long-term perspective that
most people lack.
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better education. In addition, they will do better in the college appli-
cation process. The students will be better prepared for entrance ex-
aminations like the SAT and the American College Testing
examination (ACT), and college officials will dip deeper down the
schools' class rank in making admissions decisions. A student in the
top fifth of a strong high school will often be viewed as a stronger
candidate than a student in the top twentieth or even hundredth of a
weaker school.28
This concentration of school quality can seriously disadvantage
minority students. Primary and secondary public schools are stronger
in communities with greater wealth and greater political power, but
minorities are more likely to live in communities that have little
wealth and little political power. As middle and upper income par-
ents pursue the interests of their children, they neglect the needs of
children from lower income families.
Concentrating school quality has another important feature. The
more classmates that a child has who will go on to an elite college, the
better the connections that the child will have for career advance-
ment. Hiring decisions depend on impersonal measures of "merit,"
but they also depend very much on personal relationships. 29
To be sure, if parents were operating behind a "veil of igno-
rance," 0 they would prefer a system of roughly equal school quality.
Behind the veil of ignorance, parents would not know whether their
children would be among the better off who could attend a stronger
school or among the worse off who would attend a weaker school.
Accordingly, parents would want to ensure that all schools were of
28 Personal communication, Arthur Thomas, Director of College Counseling,
Lawrenceville School, Lawrenceville, New Jersey (February 26, 1998) (observing that
the elite colleges will accept students in the top fifth of the class from strong high
schools while often rejecting even the valedictorians from the weak high schools). Of
course, the student accepted from the stronger high school may have higher SATs
than the student rejected from the weaker high school, but even if they had the same
SAT scores, the student from the stronger school would not need as high a grade
point average to be admitted. Moreover, as mentioned in the text, SAT scores are
affected by where the student attends high school.
29 See Mark S. Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM. J. Soc. 1360, 1371
(1973) (observing that people "find out about new jobs more through personal con-
tacts than by any other method"). This is not to say that it is inconsistent with a merit-
based system for personal connections to play an important role. In many jobs,
smooth interpersonal relations are critical to success. In addition, it is not always
feasible for employers to rely solely on objective measures in hiring. If there is a large
pool of qualified candidates, turning to friends or colleagues can be an efficient way
to sort through the pool quickly.
30 I am referring to an analytical device developed in JoHN RAwLs, A THEORYo oF
JuSTIcE 11-16 (1991).
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good quality. However, parents do not operate behind a veil of igno-
rance. Parents with wealth and political power can use those advan-
tages to create a system of unequal quality in which their children will
end up in the stronger schools.
2. Incentives Under the Texas Approach
If colleges start admitting the top students from all high schools
equally, students attending the "stronger" schools suddenly lose their
advantage in the admissions process. Finishing in the top ten percent
of any school may be preferable to finishing just below the top ten
percent at the stronger schools. Many students, then, will be better
off at the "weaker" high schools in terms of where they will attend
college.31 Parents will recognize that they can enhance their
childrens' future academic prospects by transferring them to schools
or moving to school districts where their children are more likely to
finish in the top ten percent of the class rank. This will be the case
especially if private universities follow the lead of public universities in
measuring academic ability solely in terms of the applicant's class
rank.32
If parents adjusted their choices of school districts, the wealthier
and more influential among them would spread their wealth and
political influence over a wider range of schools. Once their children
31 Clearly, a single college cannot accept all students from even the top 1% of the
class rank at all high schools. There are nearly 25,000 public and private high schools
in the United States. See COLLEGE ENTRANCE EXAMINATION BOARD, THE COLLEGE
BOARD GUIDE TO HIGH SCHOOLS V (2d ed. 1994). It is sufficient that the colleges give
equal consideration to all high schools of significant size and that they rotate their
admissions across those high schools from year to year.
32 For example, if Ivy League colleges admitted students only if they finished in
the top one or two percent of their class, many parents would make very different
choices for their children when selecting high schools.
In terms of actual numbers, the eight Ivy League universities fill their freshman
undergraduate classes each year with about 1.2% of all freshmen at four-year colleges.
The 44 most selective and prestigious colleges and universities in the United States fill
their freshman undergraduate classes with about 4.6% of all freshmen at four-year
colleges (the 44 schools include all of the most prestigious colleges and universities
that accept no more than 46% of their applicants). Among all undergraduate fresh-
men at private four-year colleges and universities, 3.3% attend an Ivy League school,
and 9.3% attend one of the 40 most selective and prestigious private colleges and
universities. The data on the number of college freshmen each year come from U.S.
NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 191
(1997). The data on institutional prestige and selectivity come from Best Colleges 1998,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, at 75, 80. The data on class size at individual colleges
and universities come from PETERSON'S GUIDE TO FOuR-YEAR COLLEGES 1998 (28th ed.
1997).
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While I have presented an optimistic scenario about the effects of
the Texas ten percent policy, there are important questions regarding
the likelihood that the scenario would unfold as I have suggested. In
addition, there is the possibility that the policy could have undesirable
effects. Finally, even if the policy would work as I have suggested, it
may fail in the face of a challenge to its constitutionality. It is to these
issues that I now turn, beginning with an analysis of the constitutional-
ity of the policy.
III. QUESTIONS AND CONCERNS
A. Constitutional Considerations
Undoubtedly, there will be a constitutional challenge to the
Texas law. Opponents of affirmative action will view the law as an
effort to circumvent the Hopwood decision. However, even with an in-
terpretation of Supreme Court precedents that is most unfavorable to
affirmative action, it is unlikely that the ten percent solution consti-
tutes unlawful affirmative action. None of the three potential claims
of "reverse" racial discrimination should succeed against the Texas
law.
1. Disparate Treatment
The first potential claim would be that the law is facially discrimi-
natory against whites in Texas. Laws that expressly involve racial dis-
tinctions-laws that cause disparate treatment on the basis of race-
are difficult to defend as constitutionally valid, even when they are
employed for seemingly good purposes. Indeed, the Supreme Court
has consistently rejected affirmative action programs in recent years.38
Similarly, in its voting rights cases, the Court has struck down reappor-
tionment plans that create majority-minority Congressional districts. 39
38 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (adopting a
strict scrutiny standard of review for affirmative action programs undertaken by the
federal government); City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (in-
validating Richmond's minority set aside program for municipal construction
projects).
39 In a majority-minority district, members of a racial minority constitute the ma-
jority of voters in the district. The Supreme Court has been hostile to the creation of
majority-minority districts. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996) (rejecting the
creation of three majority-minority districts in Texas' reapportionment plan); Shaw v.
Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996) (rejecting one of two majority-minority districts in the
reapportionment plan in North Carolina from Shaw v. Reno and dismissing a chal-
lenge to the second majority-minority district because appellants lacked standing to
challenge the district); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) (rejecting a reappor-
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Drawing on these precedents, plaintiffs might argue that the Texas
law is unconstitutional because it involves a racial preference or a ra-
cial gerrymandering of the admissions process. According to this
view, the Texas law amounts to a reconfiguring of the admissions pro-
cess along racial lines.
This claim should not succeed because the Texas law does not
include any facially discriminatory components. The law does not
treat minority students different from other students, nor does it treat
students at mostly African-American or Latino high schools any differ-
ently than it treats students at mostly white high schools.
2. Disparate Impact
Plaintiffs might argue instead that the Texas law is unconstitu-
tional because of a disparate racial effect. That is, even though the law
is not written in discriminatory terms, it arguably disadvantages whites
in its impact.40 Because a law can unfairly disadvantage a racial group
even though the law is racially neutral on its face, Fourteenth Amend-
ment doctrine prohibits some laws that have a racially disparate im-
pact. Under Washington v. Davis,41 a "neutral" law that has a disparate
impact is constitutionally suspect if the law was adopted with a racially
discriminatory purpose.42
Although there was clearly a racially discriminatory purpose be-
hind the Texas law (i.e., to decrease the percentage of whites in Texas
public colleges), it is highly unlikely that whites will be able to show a
tionment plan in Georgia that included three majority-minority districts); Shaw v.
Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (holding in a challenge to North Carolina's reapportion-
ment plan that conscious efforts to create majority-minority districts may violate the
equal protection clause).
40 As an example of laws with a disparate racial impact, consider laws that require
people to pay a filing fee when suing for divorce. Under these laws, African-Ameri-
cans will be relatively disadvantaged because they will be less able than whites to af-
ford the fee. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (holding that states
cannot deny a divorce to couples unable to pay court fees, but decided on the basis of
a due process right of access to the courts rather than on grounds of discrimination
against African-Americans or indigent persons).
41 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
42 Id. at 239-42 (upholding a qualifying test for police officers despite its racially
disparate impact because there was no racially discriminatory purpose behind the
adoption of the test). See also Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (holding that the racially discriminatory purpose need not
be the only purpose for the law; it need only be a "motivating factor in the decision").
However, a racially disparate law can be saved by a showing that the law would have
been adopted even if the racially discriminatory motive had not been present. See id.
at 270-71 n.21. Disparate impact can be unlawful not only under the Fourteenth
Amendment but also under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
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racially disparate impact. In general, white students have higher
grade point averages than African-Americans and Latinos. 43 More
than ten percent of whites will probably finish in the top ten percent
of high school class ranks, while fewer than ten percent of African-
Americans and Latinos will probably finish in the top ten percent of
high school class ranks.4A The Texas law is therefore most likely to
favor white students in the application process, despite the fact that
the racially discriminatory purpose was to favor African-American and
Latino students.45 In sum, a disparate impact claim would fail because
any discriminatory effects of the law could not be linked to a discrimi-
natory purpose.46
43 In California, for example, high school students are eligible for admission to
college at the nine University of California campuses if they have at least a B+ average
or if they can compensate for lower grades with a good SAT score. While 13% of
white high school graduates in the state meet the University of California academic
criteria, only about 5% of African-American students and 4% of Latino students meet
the criteria. Among admitted students at UCLA, whites have an average GPA of about
4.0, and African-Americans have an average GPA of 3.5. See Christopher Shea, Under
UCLA's Elaborate System Race Makes a Big Difference, THE CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., April
28, 1995, at A12 (noting that GPAs can be above 4.0 because of extra weight given to
grades in high school honors courses). Similarly, the median college GPA for white
students in the 1992 first-year class at the University of Texas School of Law was 3.56
compared to 3.30 for African-American students and 3.24 for Latino students. Hap-
wood, 78 F.3d at 937 n.7.
44 If the state's high schools were fully segregated by race, the law would not
result in a disparate impact. Ten percent of white high school graduates, 10% of
African-American high school graduates, and 10% of Latino high school graduates
would be eligible for automatic admission to the state's public colleges. However, the
state's high schools, though highly segregated, are not fully segregated. The presence
of some integration allows for the possibility of a racially disparate impact of the ten
percent policy if whites (or minorities) are more likely to finish in the top 10% of
their class rank.
45 This result seems odd at first glance, but it makes sense in the following way.
Although the Texas ten percent policy will favor whites (i.e., it will result in a higher
ratio of whites to minorities among University of Texas students than among Texas
high school students), it will favor them less than would the alternative admission
policies permitted by Hopwood. Or, to put it another way, traditional affirmative ac-
tion would result in the highest percentage of minority students, the ten percent pol-
icy would result in a somewhat lower percentage, and other admissions policies would
result in an even lower percentage of minority students at the University of Texas.
46 Note that the conclusion would not change with a more or less refined dispa-
rate impact analysis. One could say that we should be comparing the racial make-up
of admitted applicants either with the racial makeup of all high school graduates or
with the racial makeup of only the high school graduates who apply to four-year col-
leges. With either comparison, the ten percent policy would probably favor white
students. Among high school graduates who go on to a four-year college, white stu-
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
Plaintiffs challenging the Texas law could make a disparate im-
pact claim by arguing for a different way to frame the analysis. I have
argued that there is no unfair disparate impact on white high school
graduates since they are likely to constitute a higher percentage of
those admitted than of those who apply (or could apply). Plaintiffs
might say that, instead of comparing the racial composition of appli-
cants admitted under a ten percent policy with the racial composition
of Texas high school graduates who apply, we should compare the
racial composition of admitted applicants under the ten percent pol-
icy with what the racial composition of admitted applicants would be
in the absence of the ten percent policy. That is, they would say, the
operative question is what impact the law actually brings about com-
pared to when the law did not exist. Since the law is likely to decrease
the representation of whites in Texas public colleges, there is, in this
view, a racially disparate impact against whites.
This alternative framing has some appeal, but it is unlikely to be
successful. First, it requires a major change in disparate impact analy-
sis. Courts have not considered disparate impact doctrine in this way.
Second, the alternative framing assumes that the "correct" racial bal-
ance in the public college student body is different from the racial
balance among applicants for admission to the student body. This in
turn assumes that courts can identify when such a difference exists.
How courts would do that is unclear. Indeed, to decide on a "correct"
racial balance for the student body, the court would have to settle on
the "correct" criteria for admissions. Courts have traditionally de-
ferred to colleges and universities on these kind of educational policy
decisions,47 and it is unlikely they would want to abandon that defer-
ence. As long as an admissions policy is reasonably designed to sort
candidates, the courts are likely to uphold the policy. Although peo-
ple can differ on the question whether class rank is the best way to
dents are still more likely than minority students to finish in the top 10% of their class
rank.
As to legal precedent on this question, the Supreme Court has generally identi-
fied the relevant comparison pool as those who actually apply for the position (or
service) in question, but it has also identified the relevant pool as those who are either
actual or potential applicants since the application process itself can discourage po-
tential applicants from applying. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330 (1977).
47 See Board of Curators of the Univ. of Missouri v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 92
(1978) (upholding medical school expulsion and observing that "[c]ourts are particu-
larly ill-equipped to evaluate academic performance").
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make admissions decisions, it is undoubtedly a. reasonable way to do
SO. 4
8
3. Race-Based Motive
There is a third challenge that could be made to the Texas law.
Even if the law does not involve unlawful disparate treatment or dispa-
rate impact, it does involve a policy that is motivated by considerations
of race. In its recent affirmative action decisions, the Supreme Court
has expressed great skepticism about "governmental action based on
race."
4 9
Still, the existence of a race-based motivation to state action has
not been sufficient alone to make the action unconstitutional. The
Supreme Court has permitted racially motivated policies that neither
involved a racial classification nor had a racially disparate impact. In
Palmer v. Thompson,5 0 the Court permitted a city council to close its
municipal swimming pools following court-ordered desegregation
even though the closure was driven by a desire to avoid interracial
swimming. Since there was a neutral effect to the council action-no
one had access anymore to municipal pools-and since there was no
racial classification at work, the racially invidious motive was not a suf-
ficient reason to condemn the closure of the pools. As the Court ob-
served, even if it had struck down the law, the legislature could
reenact the law and announce a nonracial purpose.5 1 Similarly, other
legislatures could camouflage their racial motivation when enacting
racially neutral laws with no racially disparate impact.
B. Policy Considerations
Although the ten percent approach would very likely survive a
constitutional challenge, there are still important questions about my
argument that need to be addressed. For example, will parents really
respond to Texas-like admissions policies by changing where they
send their children to high school? Is it really such a good idea to
48 The absence of disparate treatment or disparate impact would also doom a
Title VI challenge to the Texas law, as well as to similar initiatives by other states or
private universities.
49 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
50 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
51 See id. at 225. I am not suggesting that I think Palmerwas correctly decided. I
agree with the four dissenters who would have found a constitutional violation. I cite
Palmer to show that a less defensible action than the Texas ten percent law has been
upheld by the Supreme Court
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place so much emphasis on class rank? I will now turn to these policy-
oriented questions and concerns.
1. The Impact of the Incentive
It is clear that the ten percent approach will change parental in-
centives, but will it change parental behavior? Parents seek a quality
education for their children not only as a means to better college ad-
missions but also as an end in itself. Moreover, weaker schools may be
schools where there is a higher risk of violence, and concerns about
safety will discourage parents from sending their children to those
schools. Although parents will have greater incentives to choose
weaker high schools for their children, it is not clear that the incen-
tives will actually affect school choice.
Given the importance to a person's future of where the person
attends college, there is reason to think that parents will respond to a
change in incentives at least to some extent. A student's opportunities
for graduate or professional education and for immediate and long-
term employment are greatly helped by attending a prestigious col-
lege. Indeed, parents already choose elite private high schools be-
cause of their high placement rate in the leading colleges. If a private
school's higher placement rate affects school choice now, a public
school's higher placement rate under the Texas policy could also af-
fect school choice.52
To put the incentives argument of the Texas policy another way,
the current college admissions process encourages parents to push for
more of a two-tiered system in the primary and secondary schools than
they otherwise would desire. By removing this incentive from the col-
lege admissions process, the Texas ten percent policy ought to make
parents less likely to favor a two-tiered system. In addition, the new
incentive of the ten percent policy could lead parents to push for
more of a one-tiered system than they otherwise would desire.
52 Under the current system, there is evidence of parents making major changes
in the lives of their families to enhance their child's chances of admission to an out-
standing college. Cases occur in which foreign national families move from the
United States back to their home countries for a child's senior year of high school to
exploit the fact that, while admissions of domestic applicants are need-blind, admis-
sions of overseas applicants are not. That is, the chances of admission from overseas
depend in part on the applicant's ability to pay the cost of tuition and living expenses.
Applicants from wealthy families therefore can increase their chances of admission if
they apply from their home country rather than from the United States, where their
ability to pay gives them no advantage in the application process.
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2. Strength of the Incentive
Although there might be some effects on school choice from a
Texas-like policy, an important question is whether the effects would
be very significant. In most states, students turn primarily to private
colleges when seeking an elite institution for higher education, so
they are not influenced by a change in admissions standards at the
state's public colleges. In a few states like Texas, California, Michigan,
or Virginia, in which there is an outstanding public university system,
the effect will be more pronounced than in a state in which the public
university system has less to offer. Still, even in those states, it is not
clear how a ten percent policy will affect behavior. On one hand, be-
cause the state university offers an outstanding education at a rela-
tively low cost, there is likely to be some effect on high school choice
at the margins, particularly for families whose budgets would be
stretched by having to pay one or more tuitions at private colleges. If,
however, a ten percent admissions policy results in a perception (or
reality) of diminished quality at the public university, many of the
strong students would probably respond to the policy by opting for
private colleges in or out of state.
For the incentive of a ten percent policy to be sufficiently mean-
ingful then, it would probably be necessary for the country's elite pri-
vate institutions to follow the lead of Texas. Adoption of a Texas-like
policy by the leading private colleges could affect incentives for high
school choice throughout the country. The colleges could decide to
accept applicants only if they finished in the top one, five, or ten per-
cent of their high school class rank.53
Policies of the elite colleges and universities can have a profound
effect on behavior at the precollege level. At one time, Harvard ad-
ministered entrance examinations in Latin, history, literature, and sev-
eral other topics as part of its admissions process. Many secondary
schools had to teach the tested topics and found that their curricula
were tightly constrained. Harvard then adopted a more flexible ad-
53 Of course, all schools cannot draw only from the top one, five, or ten percent
of the class rank. It is only necessary, however, that each school establish its cutoff at
the highest feasible point, whether that be at the top one, ten, or thirty percent.
Currently, 90% or more of students at schools like Harvard and Princeton come
from the top 10% of their high school class, roughly 45% of students at schools like
Oberlin and the University of Texas come from the top 10%, and roughly 20% of
students at schools like the University of Nebraska come from the top 10%. See CoL-
LEGE ENTRANCE EXAMINATION BoARD, THE COLL-EGE HANDBOOK 774, 966, 1005, 1261,
1581 (35th ed. 1998).
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missions policy, in large part to give high schools more freedom in
establishing their curricula.5
4
3. Private Colleges and Universities
To be sure, it is highly questionable whether the elite private in-
stitutions would adopt a Texas-like admissions policy. That approach
is attractive only in a context in which traditional affirmative action
programs are forbidden. As long as private colleges and universities
can consider race in the admissions process, they would have little
reason to switch to a process focused on high school class rank. More-
over, if any one of the schools followed the lead of Texas alone, the
school would worry that the overall quality of its student body would
decline. If Harvard used a Texas-like approach, for example, the
other Ivy League universities could attract a stronger student body
from outstanding applicants who did not finish at the very top of their
high school's class rank because they attended one of the more com-
petitive high schools. If the apparent quality of Harvard's student
body declined, it would make the school less attractive to many appli-
cants, faculty, and donors, and would likely create problems with
many alumni. Colleges and universities are well aware of the belief
that the City University of New York (CUNY) lost much of its prestige
as a result of a more open admissions policy.55
There is one potential scenario under which leading private col-
leges and universities might adopt a Texas-like admissions policy. If
the Supreme Court were to take the same view of affirmative action in
higher education as the Hopwood court, and to do so for Title VI as
well as for the Fourteenth Amendment, private institutions through-
out the country would have the same need as the Texas legislature to
find alternative ways of maintaining or increasing minority enroll-
ment. The colleges and universities might then agree among them-
selves to admit applicants who finish in the top five or ten percent of
their high school class. By agreeing to adopt such a policy jointly, the
54 See ROBERT KLITGAARD, CHOOSING ELI.S 75-76 (1985). At the time of the
entrance examinations, most students did not go on to college so they were arguably
denied the classes that would have given them the most useful preparation for their
post-graduate lives.
55 See Karen W. Arenson, With New Admissions Policy, CUNY Steps Into the Unknown,
N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1998, at Al (discussing the history of CUNY's admissions policies
and the recent decision to employ more rigorous standards). Similarly, it is believed
that open admissions policies at universities in other countries have led to a deteriora-
tion in quality in the high schools because students have a diminished incentive to
show high achievement. See KLiTGAARD, supra note 54, at 78 & n.35.
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schools could avoid the problem of their competitors taking advan-
tage of the change in admissions.5 6
Would the private institutions turn to a Texas-like approach if
they were prohibited from considering the race of applicants in the
admissions process? The Texas approach is simple and cheap to em-
ploy, but it does not allow for the nuanced, more individualized pro-
cess that the elite schools prefer. They would likely search for more
sophisticated ways to maintain the racial diversity of their student bod-
ies. Since they would be prohibited from considering race, they
would look for other characteristics, or "proxies" for race, that might
favor minorities in the admissions process. As already discussed, how-
ever, it is very difficult to find effective proxies for race.5 7 An obvious
alternative to racial preferences would be preferences for economi-
cally disadvantaged applicants, but such a preference would result in
an overwhelmingly white student body. At every income level, whites
outperform minorities on measures of academic achievement. 58 Be-
cause of the long history of racial deprivation and discrimination in
this country, it is very difficult to capture a person's race without rely-
ing directly on race to do so.
In their search for proxies for race, the elite schools would likely
end up with approaches similar to the Texas ten percent policy. In-
deed, there is an important example from the Hopwood experience to
suggest this result. After Hopwood, Southern Methodist University
56 There might be some antitrust concern with such an agreement, but the agree-
ment would likely survive a legal challenge on antitrust grounds. The most important
precedent here is the litigation over agreements by Ivy League and other leading
schools to share financial aid information and offer the same level of aid to each
student (i.e., although different students might receive different levels of aid, no stu-
dent could obtain more aid from one of the schools than from the other schools).
Although many of the schools signed a consent decree with the Justice Department,
MIT went to court, and the Third Circuit's decision in the case suggests that courts
might be sympathetic to a common admissions policy modeled upon Texas' ten per-
cent approach. See United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 678 (3d Cir. 1993) (ob-
serving that universities may be given more freedom under the Sherman Act if their
concerted action broadens accessibility to higher education because "[i]t is most de-
sirable that schools achieve equality of educational access and opportunity in order
that more people enjoy the benefits of a worthy higher education"). In addition, the
consent decree only prohibited common action on decisions about financial aid, tui-
tion and fees, and faculty salary levels. See United States v. Brown Univ., 805 F. Supp.
288 (E.D. Pa. 1991). Since antitrust law is more concerned about price-fixing than
with other kinds of concerted action, agreements about financial aid, tuition, and
faculty salaries are going to be more difficult to sustain than agreements about admis-
sions criteria.
57 See supra text accompanying notes 17-19.
58 See supra text accompanying note 18.
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(SMU), one of the top private universities in Texas, searched for a way
to maintain the racial diversity of its undergraduate student body, and
it adopted something like the state's ten percent policy for public uni-
versities. For admissions to the undergraduate freshman class, SMU
now employs a preference for students coming from the school dis-
tricts of Dallas, El Paso, Houston, and San Antonio, with particular
emphasis on Dallas5 9 and on the magnet high schools in the four cit-
ies. This "geographic" preference includes more intensive recruiting
efforts, an advantage in the admissions process, 60 and more generous
financial aid packages. 61 With its approach, SMU has been able to
maintain the racial diversity of its entering undergraduate classes be-
cause the students in the city school districts are overwhelmingly Afri-
can-Americans and Latinos. 62 The nation's elite private institutions
could achieve the same effect if they gave preference to the graduates
of high schools in heavily minority school districts throughout the
country (e.g., inner-city school districts). Although this is not quite
the same as giving preference to the students in the top of their high
schools' class rank, it would create similar incentives for school choice
and school quality. Parents would improve their childrens' chances
for acceptance to an elite school by enrolling them in a heavily minor-
ity school district, where school quality now is likely to be relatively
weak.63
59 SMU is located in Dallas, Texas.
60 Applicants are judged on several factors in the admissions process, and gradua-
tion from a high school in Dallas, El Paso, Houston, or San Antonio improves the
applicant's chances for admission.
61 Personal communication, Stanley Katz, Princeton University Professor and
Southern Methodist University Trustee (June 29, 1998); Everett Winters, Executive
Assistant to the President and Director, Affirmative Action, Southern Methodist Uni-
versity (Sep. 10, 1998).
62 For the pre-Hopwood entering classes, the percentages of African-American and
Latino students were 13.4% for Fall 1994, 14.5% for Fall 1995, and 16.7% for Fall
1996. The post-Hopwood percentages were 15.1% for Fall 1997 and 16.0% for Fall
1998. The source of this information is the Office of Institutional Research, Southern
Methodist University. (Sept. 30, 1998) (copy of written communication on file with
author).
The absence of a fall-off in minority admissions at SMU compared with minority
admissions at the University of Texas, Texas A&M, and Rice after Hopwood, see supra
text accompanying note 21, may reflect in part the fact that SMU is not as selective in
its undergraduate admissions as the other three universities. See PETERsoN's GUIDE TO
FOUR-YEAR COLLEGES 1999, at 1094, 1097, 1101, 1113 (29th ed. 1998).
63 Wealthy parents might be able to exploit an SMU-like approach more than a
Texas-like approach because they could create special, elite high schools for their
children within a heavily minority school district.
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To this point, I have discussed the likelihood that the elite private
colleges and universities would follow the Texas approach. And, as I
have indicated, they are almost certainly not going to do so in the
absence of a Supreme Court decision requiring them to abandon
traditional affirmative action policies. Still, there is the question
whether they should change their admissions policies in the direction
of the Texas ten percent policy. I turn to that question now.
4. Two-Tiered vs. Single-Tiered Schools
Even if private colleges and universities are able to maintain their
normal affirmative action policies, there is still an important moral
argument that they should adopt something like the Texas ten per-
cent policy to complement their affirmative action policies. Because
college and university admissions policies encourage disparities in
funding among different school districts, institutions of higher educa-
tion bear some moral responsibility for the funding disparities and the
accompanying disparities in educational quality among the different
school districts.64 Although there may be some room for disparities,
the magnitude of the disparities in this country has left many of our
urban public schools overrun by violence and with crumbling infra-
structures, overcrowded classrooms, inadequate textbooks and sup-
plies, and low graduation rates. 65 By adopting a Texas-like admissions
policy, private colleges and universities would create incentives for a
more equitable educational system rather than a less equitable one.
A more equitable educational system is valuable for several rea-
sons. Most importantly, it bring us closer to a country in which all
children have equal opportunities for achievement and satisfaction in
their personal and professional lives. We should minimize the disad-
64 The direct cause of funding disparities lies in the practice of states relying
heavily on local property taxes for school funding. However, we still need to explain
why the states favor that practice rather than a more equitable method of funding.
Part of the explanation is that college and university admissions policies encourage
politically influential parents to support relatively inequitable methods of school
funding.
65 See, e.g., JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALrmES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S
SCHOOLS (1991);Jane Gross, Los Angeles Schools: Hobbled and Hurting, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
16, 1993, at Al. According to a 1995 report by the U.S. General Accounting Office,
the nation's existing schools faced 112 billion dollars in pressing construction needs
while school districts were spending five billion dollars a year to repair and expand
the country's schools. See Peter Applebome, Enrollments Soar, Leaving Dilapidated
School Buildings Bursting at the Frayed Seams, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1996, at A24
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vantages that people have when they begin their adulthood.66 Both
because children lack full decision-making capacity and because their
fate is determined in large part by their parents, we do not want to
hold children as responsible for their fate as we hold adults.
It is also in the interest of society for all of its citizens to be well
educated. As the Supreme Court observed, "education provides the
basic tools by which individuals might lead economically productive
lives to the benefit of us all."67 Inadequate education leads to substan-
tial social costs in the form of financial dependency, lost taxes, delin-
quency, and incarceration costs; these are many times higher than the
cost of a decent education. 68
To be sure, society may benefit from primary and secondary
schools of great quality,69 and it is not possible for all schools to
achieve such a level of attainment.70 Although there is some merit to
this view, the argument for disparities in quality is more persuasive for
universities than for primary and secondary schools. Advances in sci-
ence and other areas of scholarship seem to be much more depen-
dent on the existence in society of outstanding universities than on
the existence of outstanding primary and secondary schools. In addi-
tion, to the extent that equalizing school quality diminishes the incen-
tive of students to achieve, the advantages of attending an elite college
should provide sufficient incentive for students to work hard during
their primary and secondary education. In any event, it may be suffi-
cient to reduce disparities in public school quality without eliminating
them entirely.
66 See George Sher, Justifying Reverse Discrimination in Employment, in AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION: SOCIAL JUSTICE OR REVERSE DISCRIMINATION? 227, 230 (Francis J. Beckwith &
Todd E.Jones eds., 1997).
67 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221-22 (1982) (finding a constitutional right to a
free public education for children of illegal aliens).
68 See Susan P. Leviton & Matthew H. Joseph, An Adequate Education for All Mary-
land's Children: Morally Right, Economically Necessary, and Constitutionally Required, 52
MD. L. REV. 1137, 1146-47 (1993).
69 Having some outstanding schools might be justified under the "difference"
principle ofJohn Rawls. According to Rawls, inequalities should be eliminated unless
the least well off are benefited by the inequalities. See RAwLs, supra note 30. Thus, for
example, a capitalist system in which there are economic disparities is permissible on
the ground that the opportunity to amass wealth is necessary to provide sufficient
incentive for productivity. Arguably, the poor are better off absolutely in a capitalist
system like the U.S. than in a socialist state like the former Soviet Union even though
they may be worse off relative to the wealthy in the society.
70 Great quality requires, among other things, outstanding principals and teach-
ers, and, unless teaching salaries are raised dramatically, it is not possible to attract
outstanding teachers for all teaching positions.
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Note that the leading private colleges and universities need not
suffer from a Texas-like admissions policy, at least in the long term.
They will worry that such a policy will result in a weaker entering class
since the top students at some schools are not as strong as lower rank-
ing students at other schools. However, if the policy has the effect of
changing school choice for high school students, then the elite
schools will still be able to fill their classes with the same kinds of stu-
dents that they have always admitted. The only difference is that the
students will come from a wider range of high schools.
5. The Role of Class Rank
Even if private colleges and universities were to adopt a Texas-like
admissions policy, there is still some question whether so much em-
phasis should be placed on class rank in the admissions process. Many
good students do not perform well in school, and a diversity of meas-
ures allows schools to account for other abilities that cannot be mea-
sured adequately by grades. Although these are legitimate points, it is
important not to overestimate their strength. Grades measure not
only academic abilities but also a student's work ethic. 71 In addition,
because students take courses in a wide variety of disciplines, includ-
ing art, literature, biology, and mathematics, grades measure a diver-
sity of abilities.
Still, we can concede that it would be a bad idea to base college
admissions solely on class rank and preserve the helpful incentives of a
Texas-like policy. If colleges want to give consideration to factors
other than class rank, they can do so without undermining the ten-
dency of Texas-like approaches to narrow disparities in high school
quality. The colleges need only ensure that, when they admit students
on the basis of other criteria, they spread those admissions broadly
across different high schools. Thus, for example, if students are ac-
cepted because of strong artistic, athletic, or musical ability, the col-
leges could ensure that they give equal consideration to the top artists,
athletes, and musicians at all high schools. If they do so, parents will
still have the same incentive to look for the "weaker" schools for their
artistically, athletically, or musically inclined children. Only this time,
they will be looking at a school's artistic, athletic, or musical strength
rather than its academic strength.72
71 See Forbath & Torres, supra note 20, at 21.
72 Under the current system, of course, many high schools recruit students for
their interscholastic athletic teams, and parents are undoubtedly enticed by the possi-
bility that their child's chances for college admission and aid on the basis of athletic
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There is an additional concern about Texas' emphasis on class
rank. Even if nonacademic criteria are used in the admissions pro-
cess, there is arguably a problem with judging academic ability on the
basis of class rank. Colleges might reject grades as the sole measure of
academic skills, observing that they use achievement test scores to cor-
rect for differences in quality among different high schools. An "A"
grade at some high schools may be the academic equivalent of a "B" at
other high schools. However, the need to correct for such differences
is an artifact of a system of uneven educational quality. In a system in
which schools are of more even quality, class rank will be a more relia-
ble measure of academic achievement.
6. Tracking
The adoption of a Texas-like system for measures of academic
and nonacademic skills could be compromised by parents trying to
"game" the system. Parents might try to undermine the effects of a
Texas-like approach in narrowing differences in school quality by in-
sisting on special classes for "gifted" students or separate tracks for
stronger students in the schools. If school resources became dispro-
portionately devoted to the students in the higher tracks, then dispari-
ties in educational quality would exist between tracks rather than
between schools.
It is difficult to know how serious a problem this would be. Many
attributes of a school, including its physical facilities and its principal,
cannot be divided among different tiers of students. In addition,
teachers' unions require uniform compensation for teachers through-
out a school, whether they are instructing the higher or lower tracks.73
The lower-track students would also benefit from their personal rela-
tionships with the upper-track students. Although there might not be
close friendships between the upper and lower-track students, re-
search has suggested that people often gain more in terms of employ-
ment and other social opportunities from their "weak" connections to
other people than from their "strong" connections.74 Thus, while stu-
dents are probably made worse off by being placed in a lower track
skills will be enhanced by enrolling at a high school with an outstanding athletic
program.
73 There is some evidence, however, that the better teachers are assigned to the
higher-track classes. SeeJeannie Oakes et al., Curriculum Differentiation: Opportunities,
Outcomes, and Meanings, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON CURRIcULUM 570, 583 (Philip
W. Jackson ed., 1992).
74 See Granovetter, supra note 29, at 1367-73; MARK S. GRANOVETTER, GETrING A
JOB: A STUDY OF CoNTAcrs AND CAREERS 51-55 (1974) (explaining this phenomenon
as a result of the facts that weaker connections tie individuals to wider networks of
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than in a higher track,75 they may be better off in a lower track at a
stronger school than in a nontracked class at a weaker school.7 6
More importantly, parents as a group may in fact oppose tracking
if elite private universities accept students only from the very top of
the class. In a tracked school, some parents could game the system by
keeping their child in a lower track to ensure that the child will finish
among the top students in the school's class rank. Eliminating track-
ing can avoid that problem. In other words, the use of tracking in the
schools is an extension of the two-tiered school system that current
college admissions policies foster. Under the current system, parents
have a strong incentive to create tiers both between schools and
within schools. Under a Texas-like system, that incentive is
diminished.
Students might also try to game a Texas-like system by taking eas-
ier courses in high school to boost their class rank. Colleges can avoid
this problem if they require (rather than simply recommend) a mini-
mum number of classes in fields that make up the core curriculum,
including English, foreign language, history, mathematics, and sci-
ence. Colleges can also correct for students whose teachers grade
generously by asking high schools to adjust each student's grade point
average in terms of the grades given in the courses taken by the
student.7 7
people than do stronger connections and that individuals may be reluctant to impose
on close friends for help in finding ajob).
75 See, e.g., JEANNIE OAxES, KEEPING TRACc How SCHOOLS STRUCTURE INEQUALFiy
(1985); Adam Gamoran & Robert D. Mare, Secondary School Tracking and Educational
Inequality: Compensation, Reinforcement, or Neutrality?, 94AM.J. Soc. 1146 (1989); Oakes,
supra note 73, at 590-93. But see Frederick Mosteller et al., Sustained Inquiry in Educa-
tion: Lessons from Skill Grouping and Class Size, 66 H~Auv. EDUC. REv. 797, 812 (1996)
(finding that there has not been the kind of rigorous study needed to determine
whether tracking has a positive or negative impact on students' learning).
76 There is some empirical support for this view. In a study comparing the effects
of tracking at public schools with the effects of tracking at Catholic schools, the au-
thor found that students in the Catholic school had higher overall academic achieve-
ment and that tracking was less detrimental to the lower track students in the Catholic
schools than in the public schools. See Adam Gamoran, The Variable Effects of High
School Tracking, 57 AM. Soc. REv. 812, 825-26 (1992). Of course, these results could
also occur if the Catholic schools started with a stronger student body such that the
lower track students in the Catholic school began with a higher level of academic
achievement than the students in the public schools.
77 Thus, for example, a B+ in a course where the average grade was a B would
mean more than in a course where the average grade was a B+. Class rank would be
calculated on the basis of adjusted grade point averages.
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7. Housing Choice
Parents might resist the incentive to change their children's
schools if it would affect their choice of where to live, but that concern
can be alleviated by allowing choice within or across school districts.
If parents could send their children to different high schools without
having to move to a less desirable residential area, they would be more
likely to change high schools. Under the current educational system,
wealthier parents prefer to link their choice of schools with their
choice of housing. By doing so, they can better preserve a two-tier
system in housing and education in which they and their children oc-
cupy both upper tiers. Under a Texas-like approach to college admis-
sions, well-to-do parents will have more reason to prefer
independence between their choice of schools and their choice of
housing, and they may therefore push for more choice within and
across school districts. 78 In other words, moving toward more of a
single-tiered educational system would be easier if parents were not
also pushed toward a single-tiered housing system.
8. Perverse Incentives
My argument is essentially based on potentially positive incentives
from an admissions policy that emphasizes class rank. However, it is
important to consider whether the policy will also have undesirable
incentives. One concern is whether such a policy would intensify the
competitiveness among students for top grades. Under the policy, stu-
dents would recognize that only the one or two students at the top of
their high school class rank could gain admission to a college like
Harvard or Princeton, so there could be intense competition for the
one or two slots. In contrast, under the current system, it is theoreti-
cally possible for a few or even several students at a particular school
to gain admission to Harvard or Princeton. Moreover, students cur-
rently do not necessarily have to end up with the highest grade point
averages in their class. 79
78 People may not like involuntary school busing, but they are less troubled by
busing when it is voluntary and it offers real advantages to their children.
To be sure, there are advantages to having children attend school close to home.
It cuts down on travel time, and it makes it easier for children to play with their
friends from school outside of school hours. Accordingly, some parents may decide
that proximity to home is more important than a better chance of admission to a
leading college.
79 In support of this argument, it has been argued that admissions policies based
on vague criteria create stronger incentives for high school students to work hard at
their studies or extra-curricular activities. If criteria for admissions are unclear, the
stronger students cannot assume that they will do very well in the admissions process,
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There may be something to this argument, but the Texas admis-
sions policy is not likely to have an important effect on the intensity of
competition. Students already believe they must have the very best
grades to be admitted to a place like Harvard or Princeton. 0 In addi-
tion, a Texas-like admissions policy does not require that admissions
be based solely on class rank. As mentioned, it would be consistent
with the policy to consider other factors, like artistic talent, athletic
ability, or even whether the applicant's parents are alumni of the col-
lege, as long as admissions based on these other criteria are spread
evenly across high schools in the United States.81
A Texas-like policy could also discourage many students from
working as hard as they otherwise might. Most students will recognize
that they have no chance to finish among the very top students in class
rank and therefore have no chance for acceptance at one of the elite
colleges or universities.8 2 In contrast, under the current system, stu-
dents without very high grades can still hope that they can compen-
sate for lower grades with other achievements that will impress college
admissions officers. "Relative deprivation" theories are relevant here
as well. According to these theories, people may be discouraged from
competing if their likelihood of success is low.8 8 If a Texas-like policy
leads to weaker schools attracting brighter students, the other stu-
dents in those schools may end up working less hard. Although this
concern is important to consider, it too would probably not make a
real impact. The ability of colleges under a Texas-like policy to admit
students on the basis of artistic, athletic, and other skills would help
motivate students who lack stellar grades. If there are students who
do not think they are outstanding in any particular area, such students
are likely to already believe that they have no chance of acceptance by
an elite college or university. In addition, there is evidence that Afri-
can-American students are more likely to attend college when they
so they will expend the extra effort to ensure acceptance. Similarly, the weaker stu-
dents need not assume that they will do poorly in the admissions process, so they also
have a greater incentive to expend extra effort than with clear criteria. See KLrGAARD,
supra note 54, at 78-79.
80 Bruce Weber, Inside the Meritocracy Machine, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 28, 1996, § 6
(Magazine), at 44.
81 See supra text accompanying note 72.
82 This will be the case especially after students receive their first year of grades in
high school, and the students with many non-A grades see that, even with all A's in
their remaining years of high school, they would not be able to move all the way up
the class rank.
83 See ChristopherJencks & Susan E. Mayer, The Sodal Consequences of Growing Up
in a Poor Neighborhood, in INNER-CT POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 111, 116 (Lau-
rence E. Lynn, Jr. & Michael G.H. McGeary eds., 1990).
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attend high schools whose students have a higher socioeconomic sta-
tus and/or higher standardized test scores.8 4 Similarly, African-Ameri-
cans finish more years of schooling when they live in more affluent
neighborhoods.8 5
IV. CONCLUSION
Rejecting traditional affirmative action is very troubling in many
ways. It suggests a serious weakening of our society's critical goal of
eliminating the effects of racial prejudice and giving real meaning to
the promise of equal opportunity for all citizens. There is reason,
however, to see a silver lining in the effort to find alternatives. If the
universities treat the top students at every high school as equally
strong candidates for admission, parents with sufficient wealth and
political power to influence school quality will have a stronger incen-
tive to ensure that every student attends a school that provides a high
quality education. Such a change could promise a substantially im-
proved education for minority students. It also might lead to greater
racial diversity in higher education as minority students come to the
college application process with stronger academic preparation.
84 See id. at 129-30.
85 See id. at 135-37.
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